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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Edmunds asserts in his brief that independent grounds for 
affirming the judgment exist in the assignment provisions of the 
Note/Agreement/Assignment ("NAA") and that Edmunds was entitled to 
share in the proceeds of the sheriff's sale. Edmunds may not thus 
claim selected benefits from the NAA while ignoring the concomitant 
burdens. The assignment provisions of the NAA could only have 
secured payment of the note provisions of the NAA. The note 
provisions exclude personal liability. The assignment provisions 
cannot negate .that exclusion. 
Even if the assignment were enforceable, there were no proceeds 
from the sale to which the assignment could attach. Edmunds' claim 
that Sprouse should have paid the amount of his sheriff's sale bid 
into court is barred by Edmunds' failure to challenge the manner 
in which the sale was conducted. 
Sprouse properly marshalled the evidence on the issue of 
whether Edmunds and his principal broker accepted the NAA. Even 
Edmunds' evidence showed that he and his broker acted at all times 
as though Sprouse's obligation to them was embodied in the NAA. 
Their actions establish, as a matter of law, that they consented 
to and accepted the NAA. 
Finally, Sprouse's failure to object at trial to Edmunds' 
proffer of evidence regarding attorney fees does not preclude 
Sprouse from challenging the award of attorney fees. Sprouse does 
not challenge the accuracy of the proffer, but only that the 
evidence proffered was insufficient to present a prima facie case. 
Sprouse v. Jager 
Case No. 890642-CA Insert to Reply Brief of Appellant 
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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant disagrees with much of the arguments set forth in 
the Brief of Respondents. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, this 
reply brief will be generally limited to answering new arguments 
raised in the Brief of Respondents. Any failure of Appellant to 
respond to any argument raised in the Brief of Respondents should 
not be viewed as an admission that the argument is well-taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF THE NAA DO NOT 
INCREASE SPROUSE^ PERSONAL LIABILITY. 
Edmunds argues in Point I of his brief that he is entitled 
to recover against Sprouse pursuant to the "assignment" portion 
of the Note/Agreement/Assignment ("NAA"). Edmunds asserts that 
the real estate commission was included in the judgment Sprouse 
obtained against Jager (the judgment debtor), and that Edmunds 
owned an assignment of the underlying Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, and that Edmunds was accordingly entitled to a share of 
the "proceeds" of the foreclosure sale. 
The primary difficulty with this argument is that the 
assignment only secured payment of the note, and other portions 
of the NAA clearly excluded any personal liability on the note. 
In addition, there were no "proceeds" of the foreclosure sale. 
Edmunds supports his argument with four subpoints. These 
points will be addressed in the order presented in Edmunds1 brief. 
A. Sprousefs Judcrment Acrainst Jager Did Not Necessarily 
Include The Commission. 
Edmunds recites that the selling price of the motel was set 
at $475,000.00 because Sprouse wanted at least $450,000.00, so the 
$25,000.00 commission was included in the sale price. Edmunds 
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further recites that Sprouse received certain properties in lieu 
of a down payment, and deduces from these facts that the commis-
sion must have been included in the unpaid balance of a contract 
due from Jager. Edmunds then argues that this reasoning process 
somehow supports his claim that Sprouse is personally liable for 
payment of the commission notwithstanding the provision of the NAA 
to the contrary. 
One cannot look at the sales price and state that the 
commission is included in any particular portion, or included at 
all. Even if that were possible, the facts and logic set forth 
by Edmunds just as readily support Sprouse's position. If Sprouse 
is personally liable for payment of the real estate commission, 
it is irrelevant whether the amount of that commission was 
"included" in the sale price or "included" in the judgment 
ultimately obtained against Jager. By arguing that the commission 
was included in the sale price and judgment, Edmunds in reality 
admits that the commission was to come only from Jager. If the 
commission is "included" anywhere and if Sprouse were personally 
liable, one would assume that the commission was "included" in the 
money or assets Sprouse has already received, i.e., the down-
payment. The portion identified by Edmunds as "including" the 
commission is that portion of the sales price which has not been 
paid. This bolsters Sprouse's contention that the commission was 
not to be paid unless Jager paid. 
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Sprouse has obtained a judgment against Jager and acknowl-
edges that if that judgment were collected from Jager, Edmunds 
would be entitled to recover his commission from the proceeds 
collected from Jager. The judgment is, however, uncollectible. 
The academic question of whether the commission is somehow 
"included" in the judgment is otherwise irrelevant. 
B. Edmunds Is Entitled To The Proceeds Of The Sheriff's 
Sale Because There Were No Such Proceeds. 
Point I.B. of Edmunds' brief argues that the assignment 
provisions of the NAA give Edmunds a right to share in the 
proceeds of the sheriff's sale. There were, however, no such 
proceeds. The only bid at the foreclosure sale was that tendered 
by Sprouse, and consisted only of a credit for the benefit of 
Jager against the judgment in favor of Sprouse. The sheriff 
conducting the sale accepted the bid and conveyed title to the 
property to Sprouse. Edmunds has not brought any action to set 
aside the sale or otherwise challenge the actions of the sheriff 
in accepting the bid, nor has Edmunds otherwise challenged the 
validity of the sale. 
In the event that any proceeds are realized from the judgment 
against Jager, however, Edmunds would be entitled to only a pro-
rata portion of those proceeds, pursuant to the authorities set 
forth in Edmunds' brief. 
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C. The Assignment Secures Only Payment of The Note, 
Sprouse did not make an absolute assignment to Edmunds of all 
of Sprouse's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but 
only assigned that interest to secure his obligations under the 
NAA. The terms of the NAA clearly limit that obligation as 
applying only to payments "received by Heritage [Thrift and Loan] 
under the Unifrom [sic] Real Estate Contract referred to above.11 
Edmunds argues, in Point I.e. of his brief, that his assigned 
rights are entitled to priority over the rights of Sprouse. The 
arguments might have merit if Sprouse had any remaining obligation 
to Edmunds which was secured by the assignment and it Sprouse had 
received any proceeds in the foreclosure. Neither of these 
factors are present. Because Sprouse1s debt to Edmunds was 
contingent upon Jager making payments, the assignment is likewise 
contingent. 
D. Sprouse Did Not Receive Any Proceeds from the Sherifffs 
Sale. 
Point II.D. of Edmunds' brief again asserts that Edmunds is 
entitled to share in the "proceeds" from the sheriff's sale. As 
explained above, however, there were no such proceeds. If Edmunds 
had an objection to the Sheriff accepting a credit bid from 
Sprouse, Edmunds should have objected to the sale and filed 
appropriate pleadings to set it aside. Having failed to object 
to the manner in which the sale was conducted, Edmunds cannot now 
claim an entitlement to "proceeds" which do not exist. 
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POINT II 
THE ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF THE NAA DO 
NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS RELIEVING 
SPROUSE OF PERSONAL LIABILITY. 
Edmunds argues in Point II of his brief (at p. 28) , that 
there was no point in making an assignment of a portion of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract if Jager has no personal liability. 
The exclusion of personal liability could be construed to limit 
the effect of the assignment. It does not follow, however, that 
the provisions are inherently conflicting and that the exclusion 
of personal liability must be totally eliminated in order to give 
greater effect to the assignment. The rule of construction is 
clearly to the contrary. All of the parts of a contract should 
be given effect insofar as is possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy 
Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
The assignment provision of the NAA does have a purpose, even 
with the exclusion of personal liability. As proffered by Mrs. 
Sprouse, the purpose was to permit Edmunds to protect his commis-
sion by stepping into the shoes of Mr. Sprouse and foreclosing 
against Jager if necessary. (Tr. 255.) In fact, if Sprouse has 
been personally liable for the commission, there would have been 
little need for the assignment. Had Sprouse been personally 
liable, Edmunds could have enforced that liability by action 
directly against Sprouse. If he had been successful in obtaining 
a judgment against Sprouse, he could have executed on Sprousefs 
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interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The granting of an 
assignment and the concomitant right of stepping into Mr. 
Sprouse's shoes to foreclose against Jager was necessary only 
because Sprouse was not personally liable. 
POINT III 
EDMUNDS AND HIS BROKER MUST BE DEEMED, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE NAA. 
Edmunds asserts on page 39 of his brief that Sprouse has 
failed to marshall all the evidence both for and against the trial 
court's findings relating to the NAA. Although Sprouse has not 
restated the entire transcript, Sprouse did set forth the primary 
testimony both for and against the NAA. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 
21-22.) Sprouse has thus fulfilled his duty to marshall the 
evidence. 
The primary thrust of Sprouse's argument, however, was not 
that there was no conflicting evidence, that rather that even 
Edmunds' evidence established, as a matter of law, that Edmunds 
and his broker had accepted the NAA. Edmunds' broker assigned the 
NAA to Edmunds shortly after closing. Edmunds subsequently 
assigned the NAA to a bank. Although not initially named as a 
party to this action, Edmunds filed an affidavit in the action to 
assert rights under the NAA. Edmunds' initial pleadings in this 
action assert rights under the NAA. 
Edmunds argues that his actions in purchasing an assignment 
of the NAA for full cash value is inconsistent with the limitation 
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of personal liability, and that only a fool would have made such 
a transaction if the limitation of personal liability were 
enforceable. It is not the province of the courts, however, to 
inquire into the wisdom of a transaction. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983). It is possible that Edmunds 
purchased the assignment for full cash value because he believed 
that Jager would pay. (Sprouse presented evidence that Edmunds 
had made glowing representations concerning Jager's ability to 
pay. E.g., Tr. 168-69.) There may have been other factors. The 
reasons why he made the assignment are not particularly important, 
because there is no dispute that the assignment was made, and that 
Edmunds and his broker consistently acted as though Sprouse's 
obligation to them was embodied in the NAA. The great weight of 
the evidence established, as a matter of law, that Edmunds and his 
broker had accepted the NAA, and are bound by all of its terms. 
POINT IV 
SPROUSE'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROFFER 
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT PREVENT 
HIM FROM CONTESTING THEM ON APPEAL. 
In Point IV of his initial brief, Sprouse challenged that 
award of attorney fees on two grounds: First, that Edmunds failed 
to present a prima facie case that the fees were reasonable, and 
second, that only a third of the fees were related to the points 
on which Edmunds prevailed. Edmunds has responded by asserting 
that Sprouse did not object to the evidence at trial and is 
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therefore precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and that the claim is raised for the first time on 
appeal. These argument will be addressed in order. 
Edmunds argues that he proffered evidence at trial concerning 
his attorney fees, and that Sprouse is somehow bound by that 
proffer. (Brief of Respondents, page 44.) On page 46 of his 
brief, Edmunds refers to the proffer as a "stipulation and 
proffer." No stipulation was made. The transcript (a copy of 
which is attached as Appendix "H" to Appellant's Brief) demon-
strates that Sprouse's counsel initially queried whether the 
parties could reach a stipulation concerning reasonableness, but 
Edmunds counsel instead made of proffer of what the testimony 
would be. (Tr. 162.) The only response of Sprouse's counsel to 
the proffer was an acknowledgement that it correctly reflected 
what the testimony would be. (Tr. 163-64.) No stipulation or 
other agreement was made concerning the reasonableness of the 
fees. 
Sprouse still does not challenge the validity of the proffer. 
Sprouse further does not dispute that the hours were spent as 
testified. Sprouse only asserts that the evidence proffered was 
not sufficient to make a prima facie entitlement to an award of 
attorney fees. 
Edmunds asserts that had Sprouse challenged the evidence, he 
could have presented additional evidence at the trial. The 
defendant does not, however, have the burden to explaining to the 
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plaintiff, prior to the plaintiff resting his case, in what areas 
the plaintiff's proof is deficient. It is the burden of plaintiff 
to present a prima facie case. If he fails to do so, the defend-
ant may move for a dismissal without ever having made any objec-
tion to the evidence. See Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
Sprouse is not, therefore, trying to avoid any stipulation 
he made. Sprouse simply asserts that Edmunds failed to present 
a prima facie case, and further, even if a prima facie case was 
presented, two-thirds of the fees are not recoverable in any event 
because they were not related to the points on which Edmunds 
prevailed. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 
643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Edmunds also asserts that this issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal. The issue was raised at least as early as the 
hearing on Sprouse's "Motion for New Trial," which was made prior 
to the entry of the judgment. (Minute Entry, March 14, 1989.) 
CONCLUSION 
The great weight of the evidence admits of no other con-
clusion but that Edmunds and his principal broker accepted all the 
benefits of the NAA, and viewed Sprouse's obligations for the 
payment of a real estate commission to be embodied in the NAA. 
Edmunds continues, on appeal, to assert that he is entitled to 
benefits from the NAA. Any benefits from the NAA must come 
together with the burdens. The limitation of personal liability 
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in the NAA is enforceable according to its terms. The judgment 
against Sprouse must be reversed. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 1990. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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